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Closing 
The Classroom Door 
On Civil Rights 
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In its zeal to stop 
school busing, the 
Reagan administration 
has effectively 
closed the classroom 
door on civil rights 
enforcement 
by Neal Devins 
William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant 
Attorney General for Civil Rights, is 
convinced that the civil rights com-
munity is out to get him. He prefaced 
a Justice Department report defen-
ding the Department's civil rights en-
forcement record with the comment: 
"All too often sensational charges of 
'retreat' and 'roll back' purporting to 
be 'well-documented' attract instant 
media attention, while a responsible 
reply which exposes the falseness of 
the original charges receives no 
coverage. In this instance, we believe 
that the public has a 'right to know' 
the facts, rather than be left with false 
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impressions created by press reliance 
on continued misstatement." (Cor-
recting the Record of Civil Rights 
Enforcement, January 20, 1981 to Sep-
tember 30, 1982; A Response to the 
Report of the Washington Council of 
Lawyers. November, 1982 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Washington Council 
Response].) 
Mr. Reynolds has claimed, that the 
Civil Rights Division is acting in a re-
sponsible manner. Yet, over the past 
three years, stern criticism has been 
levied against the division by many 
civil rights groups. Most noticeable, 
three "in-depth" reports have been 
issued by the civil rights proponents 
criticizing almost every action taken 
by the CRD. [See Leadership Confer-
ence on Civil Rights, Without Justice: 
A Report on the Conduct of the Justice 
Department in Civil Rights in 1981-82, 
February 1982 [hereinafter referred to 
as Leadership Conference]; Washing-
ton Council on Lawyers, Reagan Civil 
Rights: The First Twenty Months, Sep-
tember 1982 [hereinafter referred to 
as Washington Council]; American 
Civil Liberties Union, Civil Liberties in 
Reagan's America, October 1982 
[hereinafter referred to as ACLU].) Ad-
ditionally, the U.S. Commission on 
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Civil Rights, as well as the more spe-
cialized civil rights interest groups, 
have criticized nearly all CRD policy 
initiatives. 
The overwhelmingly negative re-
sponse by civil rights interests to Mr. 
Reynolds' CRD is not at all surprising. 
As Chester Finn noted, "Ronald 
Reagan assumed office after a de-
cade and a half in which the presi-
dency (particularly the Carter 
Administration) had vigorously 
sought to advance group interests 
through regulation, judicial inter-
pretation, and government expen-
diture, and in which policy conflicts 
between group interests and in-
dividual rights, on the one hand, and 
between group interests even-
handed national standards on the 
other, were almost always resolved 
in favor of the interested groups." 
(Finn," 'Affirmative Action' Under 
Reagan," p.20, Commentary, April 
1982.) Thus, civil rights interests had 
come to expect that a sympathetic 
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executive branch would assist them 
in achieving their policy objectives. 
President Reagan did not offer such 
sympathy. The 1980 GOP platform 
stated that: "[E]qual opportunity 
should not be jeopardized by bu-
reaucratic regulations and decisions 
which rely on quotas, ratios, and 
numerical requirements to exclude 
some individuals in favor of others, 
thereby rendering such regulations 
and decisions inherently discrimina-
tory." 
Since the policy objectives of the 
Reagan administration represented a 
retrenchment from previous "victo-
ries" for the cause of civil rights, civil 
rights proponents felt compelled to 
criticize the new administration mer-
ely to stay its ground. Despite this, the 
criticisms levied against the Reagan 
Administration have been especially 
strong. The American Civil Liberties 
Union contended that "for this ad-
ministration, the erosion of the Bill of 
Rights seems to be a primary goal, not 
a side effect. This administration 
seeks to make structural changes 
in our system of government that, 
should they succeed, will not be easy 
to overcome once their time in office 
passes." (ACLU, p.2.) Along the same 
lines, the Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights noted in its report criticiz-
ing CRD: "[O]ne thing has become 
painfully clear. At the Justice Depart-
ment in 1982, basic qualities of fair-
mindedness and fidelity to the law 
are lacking. Instead, power and prej-
udice hold sway." (Leadership Con-
ference, p.75.) The National Urban 
League opened the 1982 edition of its 
annual report on "The State of Black 
America" with a similar commentary: 
"At no point in recent memory had 
the distance between the national 
government and black America been 
greater than it was in 1981, nor had 
the relationship between the two 
been more strained." 
What is it about CRD policies that 
have caused such an extreme outcry? 
The Leadership Conference claimed 
that CRD had: 
• repudiated the Supreme Court's 
definitive interpretation of the 
Constitution and laws and an-
nounced that it would refuse to 
enforce the law of the land; 
• abruptly switched sides in cases 
pending before the Supreme 
Court and announced that it 
would seek the overturning of 
Supreme Court decisions of very 
recent vintage, in dis regard of the 
importance of certainty and con-
tinuity in the law; 
• sought to undermine confidence 
in the judiciary by launching a 
sweeping attack on the federal 
courts for performing their con-
stitutional role of protecting the 
rights of minorities from intru-
sions of majority will; 
• established itself as the locus of 
anti-civil rights activity in the 
federal government, reaching in-
to other agencies to try to curb 
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policies deemed overly protec-
tive of civil rights; 
• cooperated in the corruption of 
the legal process by allowing its 
decisions to be shaped by ap-
peals from politicians not based 
on law. 
Specifically, CRD critics allege: (1) In 
Fair Housing Law Enforcement, "The 
Division has abandoned entirely fil-
ing suits against discriminatory zon-
ing ordinances. Its attorneys have not 
been permitted to review the 'effects' 
of housing policy as well as the moti-
vation for it, although the effects test 
is the prevailing law of the land." 
(Washington Council, p.2.) (2) On the 
voting rights issues, CRD is alleged to 
have refused to pursue new cases and 
reversed litigation positions es-
tablished during previous administra-
tions. (Washington Council, p.3.)(3) In 
the field of equal employment oppor-
tunity, "The Division has flatly repu-
diated the well-established require-
(P/ease turn to page 44) 
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ment that affirmative action may be 
necessary to remedy certain types of 
employment discrimination, announ-
cing that under no circumstances 
would it impose such relief regardless 
of the particular case." (Washington 
Council, p.6.) (4) In criminal court 
rights prosecutions, CRD critics note 
that "although the level of racially 
motivated violence appears to be on 
the increase, the Division's capacity 
for prosecuting these cases does not 
show a proportionate increase." 
(Washington Council, p.S.) 
CRD policies in equal education 
opportunity have been the most 
severely criticized. Great emphasis 
has been place on CRD's failure to in-
itiate desegregation lawsuits. (Wash-
ington Council, p.2.) CRD also refuses 
to pursue busing remedies in desegre-
gation lawsuits. (Leadership Confer-
ence, p.11.) CRD similarly refuses to 
make use of the presumption that 
proof of intentional segregation in a 
"significant" portion of a school dis-
trict suggests that there was inten-
tional segregation in other racially 
imbalanced portions of the district. 
(Washington Council, p. 29-30.) In 
higher education cases, CRD has en-
tered into settlements which alleg-
edly violate standards established by 
the Department of Education. (lea-
dership Conference, p.28.) CRD sup-
posedly "has also assisted in a con-
certed effort to deprive the federal 
courts of their discretion to employ 
busing as a remedial device where 
appropriate (by contending that Con-
gress can severely restrict the juris-
diction of federal courts to order bus-
ing)." (Washington Council, p.43-44.) 
Finally, CRD provided "the impetus 
for the Reagan Administration in 
its attempt to grant tax exemptions 
to racially discriminatory private 
schools." (Leadership Conference, 
p.16.) 
The sheer volume of criticism 
levied against CRD makes most diffi-
cult the chore of deciphering valid 
from invalid criticism. This essay con-
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sequently will pursue the more 
modest aim of providing a critical re-
view of the CRD legal analyses af-
fecting the "race and schooling" 
issue for elementary and secondary 
education. Three subjects will be ex-
amined: forced busing and scope of 
relief in desegregation lawsuits, Con-
gress' ability to limit court desegrega-
tion orders, and the tax-exempt status 
of racially discriminatory private 
schools. Although my analysis sug-
gests that CRD policy is in grave error 
on the "race and schooling" issue, 
this conclusion does not necessarily 
suggest that all CRD policies are off 
base. 
The question of "race and school-
ing" has traditionally been the center-
piece of America's civil rights move-
ment. As David Kirp noted, Brown v. 
Board of Education symbolized the 
universalistic vision that: "Once ra-
cial barriers were lifted, it was sup-
posed, there would exist neither 
white schools nor black schools, but 
'just schools.' When the dual system 
Closing the classroom door on civil rights 
was dismantled, the constitutional 
rights of blacks would be secured; so 
too would their opportunity for social 
and economic equality. Blacks,like 
whites, would then be free to succeed 
or fail on the basis of merit, not 
caste." (D. Kirp, just Schools, (1982).) 
This universalistic vision has not seen 
fruition, however. The Supreme 
Court consequently has rejected the 
use of "freedom-of-choice" plans 
which permit white and black stu-
dents to choose, whether they would 
prefer to go to the previously all-
black high school or the previously 
all-white high school. (See, e.g., Green 
v. County School Board of New Kent 
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).) 
In place of such voluntary reme-
dies, the Supreme Court has found 
permissible remedies which require 
the rearrangement of attendance 
zones and mandatory pupil transpor-
tation. (See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Meckenburg County Board of Educa-
tion, 402 U.S.1 (1971).)The Supreme 
Court, has also established an impor-
tant presumption that proof of inten-
tional segregation in a significant 
portion of a school district infers that 
there was intentional segregation in 
other racially imbalanced portions of 
the district. (See, Keyes v. (Denver) 
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 
(1973).) This presumption was based 
on the Court's recognition of the dif-
ficulty of proving intentional segrega-
tion in Northern and Western school 
systems where segregation had not 
been mandated by state laws. 
The Department of Justice (DO)) is 
the primary law enforcer in the field 
of school desegregation. DOJ may 
presently initiate or intervene in 
school desegregation lawsuits under 
federal statutes that prohibit racial 
discrimination by educational institu-
tions at the state or local level. DOJ 
has advocated the civil rights posi-
tion before the Supreme Court in 
those cases which rejected voluntary 
freedom of choice plans, recognized 
that mandatory busing can be an ap-
propriate remedy, and established 
the common-sense presumption that 
intentional segregation in one por-
tion of a school district infers inten-
tional segregation in other racially 
imbalanced portions of that district. 
The Reagan Justice Department 
has rejected both mandatory busing 
as an appropriate remedy and the use 
of the Keyes presumption to establish 
liability in desegregation lawsuits. 
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds 
expressed concern that mandatory 
pupil transportation remedies per se 
"are threatening to dilute the essen-
tial (national) consensus that racial 
discrimination is wrong and should 
not be tolerated in any form." 
(Speech before the Delaware Bar As-
sociation, p.9, February 1982.) He ad-
ded: 
The flight from urban public 
schools has eroded the tax base 
of many cities, which has in turn 
contributed to the growing ina-
bility of many school systems to 
provide high-quality education 
to their students-whether 
black or white. Similarly, the 
loss of parental support and in-
volvement has robbed many 
public school systems of a criti-
cal component of successful ed-
ucational programs. When one 
adds to these realities the grow-
ing empirical evidence that raci-
ally balanced public schools 
have failed to improve the edu-
cational achievement of the stu-
dents, the case for mandatory 
busing collapses. 
Instead of mandatory pupil transpor-
tation, CRD now advances a remedial 
strategy program which includes 
"[t]he voluntary student assignment 
program, magnet schools, and en-
hanced curriculum requirements, 
faculty incentives, in-service training 
programs for teachers and adminis-
trators, school closings, if you have 
excess capacity, or new construction 
where that may be called for." 
(School Desegregation, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the Com-
mittee on the judiciary, House of Re-
presentatives, Nov. 1981, p.631.) 
Assistant Attorney General Reyn-
olds alleges that the CRD position is 
consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dents. First, in regard to the Court's re-
jection of an ineffective "freedom-of-
choice" plan, Mr. Reynolds contends 
that "the Court held simply that the 
Constitution requires racially non-
discriminatory student assignments 
and eradication of the segregative 
effects of past intentional racial 
discrimination by school officials." 
(Testimony of William Bradford 
Reynolds, Subcommittee on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Committee on 
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the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
October 1981, p.6.) Second, Mr. Reyn-
olds argues that when the Supreme 
Court ~pproved the use of busing "[it] 
spoke m measured terms, expressing 
reserved acceptance of busing as but 
one of a number of remedial devices 
available for use when ... it is 'prac-
ticable,' 'reasonable,' 'feasible,' 
'workable,' and 'realistic.' The Court 
clearly did not contemplate indis-
criminate use of busing without 
regard to other important, and often 
conflicting considerations." (ld at 7). 
Third, CRD "concluded that involun-
tary busing has largely failed in two 
major respects: (1) it has failed to eli-
cit public support and (2) it has failed 
to advance the overriding goal of 
equal education opportunity. Adher-
ence to an experiment that has not 
withstood the test of experience ob-
viously makes little sense." (ld at 11.) 
Social science research and estab-
lished constitutional doctrine gener-
ally refute the CRD position. First, 
academic gains appear to outweigh 
academic losses. (See, e.g., Hawley, 
"The New Mythology of School De-
segregation," 42 Law and Contempo-
rary Problems 214 (Spring 1978).) 
Second, and more significant, the 
constitutional infirmity which dese-
gregation remedies address is racial 
isolation in the public schools, not 
disparities in academic achievement 
between blacks and whites. Thus, the 
focus of the initial remedy in a deseg-
regation case should be to address 
the problem of racial imbalance in 
the public schools. Social science evi-
dence clearly demonstrates that 
mandatory pupil transportation rem-
edies are more effective than volun-
tary remedies in addressing the prob-
lem of racial isolation in the public 
schools. (See, e.g., M. Smylie, Reduc-
ing Racial Isolations in LargeSchool 
Districts: The Comparative Efficiency 
of Mandatory and Voluntary Desegre-
gation Strategies (1982).) 
CRD's legal analysis is also faulty 
both because it ignores germane por-
tions of the cases that it reviews and 
because it ignores recent Supreme 
Court decisions pertinent to the bus-
ing issue. The Supreme Court, in ap-
proving the use of mandatory pupil 
reassignments, recognized that in 
order to eliminate all vestiges of an 
unconstitutional dual school system, 
desegregation remedies may be "ad-
ministratively awkward, inconve-
nient, and even bizarre." (Swann v. 
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 
(1971 ).) Thus, even if Mr. Reynolds is 
correct that busing "has failed to 
elicit public support," the constitu-
tional question is whether busing ef-
fectively addresses the problem of 
racial isolation in the public schools. 
CRD also ignores recent Supreme 
Court decisions speaking to the con-
tined efficacy of mandatory busing. 
University of Chicago law professor 
Edmund Kitch summarizes these de-
cisions as follows: "The Court en-
dorses an approach to the 'factual' 
question that makes proof of a neigh-
borhood school policy into proof of 
racial discrimination. It then ap-
proves a remedy which, by implica-
tion, assumes that a neighborhood 
school policy, when combined with 
any significant residential segrega-
tion, is unconstitutional." (Kitch, 
"The Return of Color-Consciousness 
to the Constitution: Weber, Dayton, 
and Columbus," 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
1,6 (1980).) 
This view, thatthe Court views bus-
ing as a constitutionally mandated 
remedy, has also surfaced in the Su-
preme Court's denial of certiorari in 
the Dallas (1980) and Nashville (1983) 
desegregation lawsuits. In Dallas, the 
Court refused to review the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals overturning of 
a District Court order which substi-
tuted educational remedies and 
neighborhood schools for system-
wide busing based on black-white 
student population ratios. (Estes v. 
Metropolitan Branches of Dallas 
NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980).) Ironi-
cally, CRD had sought to buttress its 
argument that busing is improper by 
quoting Justice Powell's dissent to 
the Court's denial of certiorari in that 
case. (See, e.g., Reynolds, Oct. 1981 
testimony, p.9; Reynolds, Nov. 1981 
testimony, p. 9-10.) The Supreme 
Court, in the Nashville case, similarly 
refused to review an appellate court 
decision holding that a district court 
could not substitute educational 
remedies for mandatory busing, des-
pite the District Court's finding that 
busing has proven ineffective in that 
school system. (Kelley v. Metropoli-
tan County Board of Education, 103 S. 
Ct. 834 (1983).) The Justice Depart-
ment intervened in Nashville claim-
ing that "[Supreme Court decisions 
do] not mandate the use of any partie-
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ular remedial device [e.g., busing] but 
instead indicate in general terms 
which devices are permissible and 
whatthe limits on their use might be." 
(Kelley, Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, p.10.) This contention, however, 
was inapposite to the legal issue 
raised in Nashville. Nashville did not 
call into question the propriety of 
judicially mandated busing orders. 
Instead, Nashville raised the issue of 
what legal significance ought to be 
attributed to the long-term efforts of 
school boards trying to implement 
mandatory pupil transportation 
orders. CRD thus tried to use this case 
as a political vehicle to further the 
Reagan administration's anti-busing 
policies. (See Devins, "New Dilem-
mas and Opportunities in Integrating 
Schools," Education Week, Mar. 9, 
1983, p. 24.) 
CRD, in addition to its refusal to 
pursue busing remedies, "will not 
make use of the Keyes presumption 
(that intentional segregation in one 
part of a school system suggests in-
tentional segregation in other parts), 
but will define the violation precisely 
and seek to limit the remedy only to 
those schools in which racial imba-
lance is the product of intentionally 
segregative acts of state officials." 
(Reynolds, Oct. 1981 testimony, p. 
12.) The Supreme Court had devised 
this presumption because it felt that 
"common sense dictates the conclu-
sion that racially inspired school 
board actions have an impact beyond 
the particular schools that are the 
subject of those actions." (Keyes, 413 
u.s. 189, 202 (1973).) 
Assistant Attorney General Rey-
nolds offered the following rationale 
for CRD's refusal to use Keyes in its 
decision to initiate litigation: "To 
avoid imposition of a system-wide 
desegregation plan, which often in-
cludes system-wide busing, a school 
board subject to the Keyes presump-
tion must shoulder the difficult bur-
den of proving that racial imbalance 
in schools elsewhere in the system is 
not attributable to school authori-
ties .... [The Keyes presumption has 
been used] in some instances in im-
position of system-wide transporta-
tion remedies encompassing not only 
de jure, or state imposed, racial segre-
gation, but de facto racial segregation 
as well." (Reynolds, Nov. 1981 testi-
mony, p.11-12 (emphasis supplied).) 
The pol icy imp! ications of the CRD 
approach were noted in the Washi,ng-
ton Council Report: 
This shift in policy has more 
than theoretical importance. By 
seeking relief in only part of a 
school system where segrega-
tion has occurred, the Division 
will encourage residential insta-
bility and "white flight" as 
parents seek to transfer their 
children to schools unaffected 
by desegregation. In addition, 
meaningful desegregation may 
often be impossible if only a 
fraction of a school district is in-
volved. The Division's new poli-
cy, therefore, can only lead to 
the very unstable and ineffec-
tive attempts to desegregation 
which the Division's own leader-
ship has decried. (Washington 
Council, p. 48.) 
The CRD policy is also unsavory 
because it seeks to minimize the 
remedial duties of school districts 
already found guilty of significant 
acts of intentional segregation. The 
Keyes presumption is only triggered if 
there is intentional segregration in a 
significant portion of a school 
district. Thus in its effort to avoid "un-
fair application of the Keyes 
presumption," CRD is willing to err on 
the side of those school districts 
found guilty of intentional segrega-
tion. 
CRD's policy is also inconsistent 
with the Supreme Courts view on this 
issue. Over the past five years, Court 
desegregation decisions evidence a 
view on the part of the Justices that, 
absent intentional government segre-
gation, ours would be a naturally in-
tegrated world. Under this approach, 
it is proper to make a finding of a sys-
tem-wide violation in a racially im-
balanced school system guilty of in-
tentional segregation in significant 
portions of the system. CRD's view of 
granting relief based solely on the in-
cremental effects of proven discrimi-
nation suggests that ours might be a 
naturally segregated world. Justices 
Rehnquist and Powell support this in-
terpretation of the law. 
CRD has sought to limit criticism 
on the Keyes presumption issue, 
claiming that "the Assistant Attorney 
General was extremely careful to 
make clear that his use of the Keyes 
presumption would be limited ... to 
the litigation stages of a school case, 
and would not be used as an investi-
gatory tool to avoid ferreting out the 
real facts about alleged segregative 
practices, procedures and attitudes 
of school authorities." (Washington 
Council Response, p.13 n9.) This 
remark is a nonsequitur, however. If 
CRD is unwilling to make use of the 
Keyes presumption in its decision to 
initiate a lawsuit, because of possible 
"unfair" consequences, CRD clearly 
will not seek system-wide relief 
unless there is proven intentional 
segregation throughout the system. 
This is evidenced by CRD's failure to 
"initiate" any new desegregation law-
suits. Ultimately, CRD's rhetoric 
about the inequities of the Keyes 
presumption seem little more than a 
smokescreen for Department hostil-
ity towards expansive desegregation 
remedies, particularly busing. 
CRD's hostility to the busing reme-
dy and the Keyes presumption will 
impede the advancement of the goals 
of desegregation as established by 
the Supreme Court. Worse than this, 
CRD policies may spur on future 
school district inadventure. Witness 
the following colloquy between 
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds 
and the counsel for the House Sub-
committee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights: 
Counsel: Are you suggesting 
that if a community intentional-
ly chooses sites for its schools 
that create a segregated system, 
and those schools are built, 
there should be no remedy that 
actually desegregates these 
facilities other than on a volun-
tary basis? 
Mr. Reynolds: I think using those 
[voluntary] desegregation tech-
niques that I mentioned to you, I 
would say that would be the pro-
per way to address the problem. 
I think that every kid in America 
has a right to an integrated 
education where he wants it, 
especially if you have a situation 
(of intentional segregation). 
(Testimony , Nov. 1981, p. 632) 
(emphasis supplied). 
CRD's hostility towards the busing 
remedy is also reflected by the Divi-
sion's response to congressional ef-
forts to limit both federal court juris-
diction in desegregation suits and 
CRD authority to pursue the busing 
remedy. The Senate, in September 
47 
Neal Devins 
Social science evidence 
clearly demonstrates 
that mandatory pupil 
transportation remedies 
are more effective than 
voluntary remedies in 
correcting the problem 
of racial isolation in 
public schools 
Closing the classroom door on civil rights 
1981, passed the so-called Helms 
Amendment which (1) forbids "the 
Department of Justice to bring or 
maintain any sort of action to require 
directly or indirectly the transporta-
tion of any student to a school other 
than the school which is nearest the 
student's home," (Helms Amend-
ment No. 69,127 Cong. Rec. 56274 
(daily ed. 6/16/81 ).) and (2) forbids any 
federal court to "order or issue any 
writ ordering directly or indirectly 
any student to be assigned or to be 
transported to a public school [more 
than 10 miles or 15 minutes away 
from that school] ... which is nearest 
to the student's residence." (127 
Cong. Rec. S 6644-45 (daily ed. 
6/22/81).) On May 6, 1982, Attorney 
General William French Smith an-
nounced that the Department of Jus-
tice concluded that the court-curbing 
bill was constitutional. (Letter from 
William French Smith to Peter W. 
Rodino, Chairman of Committee on 
the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives.) On July 22, 1982, Theodore 
Olson, Assistant Attorney General for 
the Office of Legal Counsel, testified 
before a House Subcommittee in fa-
vor of the constitutionality of the pro-
hibition of CRD efforts to pursue bus-
ing remedies. (Testimony of Theo-
dore B. Olson.) 
Attorney General Smith's conclu-
sion that Congress was empowered to 
limit court desegregation remedies 
were premised on two dubious pre-
sumptions. 
First, the Attorney General ruled 
that "[t]he substantial weight of the 
text and legislative history supports 
the proposition that the bill limits the 
remedial power of the federal courts, 
not the Supreme Court." (Letter, p. 5.) 
This conclusion is of great signifi-
cance since "a Supreme Court with 
authority to review and revise lower 
and state court judgments may be 
constitutionally necessary to assure 
the national uniformity and suprem-
acy of the Constitution and federal 
law." (Dale, Legal Analysis Regarding 
the Transportation of Students, p. 42; 
see also Radner, "Congressional 
Power Over the Appellate Jurisdic-
tion of the SupremeCourt,"109 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 151,160-67 (1960); Hart, "The 
Power of Congress to Limit the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts: An Exercise 
in Dialectic," 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 
(1953).) The Attorney General based 
this reading primarily on the fact that 
the bill recited Article ! II Section 1 of 
the Constitution as Congress' source 
of power for enacting the measure. 
Section 1 of Article Ill provides 
authority for limiting the jurisdiction 
and the powers of the inferior federal 
courts, not the Supreme Court. Yet, 
Justice Department officials later 
noted: "We have observed in the 
legislative history certain ambiguous 
statements upon which an argument 
might be based that a restriction on 
the powers of the Supreme Court may 
have been intended." Finally, 
Senator Johnson (a co-sponsor of the 
measure) has stated subsequent to 
the passage by the Senate of S. 951 
that he fully intended its provisions to 
apply equally to the inferior federal 
courts and the Supreme Court. Con-
sidering this discrepancy between the 
Attorney General's reading of the bill 
and that of bill sponsor Johnson, it 
may well be that the Attorney 
General opted for his reading of the 
bill in order to duck the constitutional 
issue and thereby encourage congres-
sional passage of such jurisdiction-
limiting measures. 
The Attorney General also argued 
"that the time and distance limita-
tions contained in ... the bill would 
serve as legislative benchmarks for 
federal and state courts in the future 
in devising appropriate decrees .... 
This limited effect on the court's re-
medial power does not convert the ju-
dicial power-to hear and decide 
particular cases without any power to 
issue relief affecting individual legal 
rights or obligations in specific 
courts." (Letter, p. 10, p.12.) The accu-
racy of this statement, however, is 
contingent on the accuracy of the At-
torney General's view that student 
transportation is never a necessary 
feature of a remedial desegregation 
decree. If a court views as necessary 
mandatory transportation remedies 
extending beyond Congress' pro-
posed time-distance limitations, con-
gressional action might foreclose 
court remedial power. Considering 
that racial isolation is the wrong ad-
dressed in desegregation orders and 
that mandatory remedies are more 
effective than voluntary ones, it 
would seem that the Attorney Gener-
al is wrong when he speaks of "[t]his 
I im ited effect on the court's remedial 
power." 
The Helms Amendment would 
have also prohibited the Department 
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of Justice from bringing or maintain-
ing any action which might require 
the busing of school children. Attor-
ney General Smith concluded that 
this action "would be constitutional 
if read to preserve the government's 
ability to fulfill its Fifth Amendment 
obligations by initiating anti-discrim-
ination suits, restricting only, and in a 
very limited fashion, the Depart-
ment's participation, by seeking a 
busing order, in the remedial phase of 
such suits." (Letter, p. 14; emphasis 
supplied; see also Testimony of 
Theodore Olson p. 32-44.) This analy-
sis, like the analysis of the jurisdiction 
limiting provision, assumes that bus-
ing is a non-essential remedy. Other-
wise, DOJ authority would be re-
stricted significantly, not "in a very 
limited fashion." Yet, as Charles Dale 
of the Congressional Research Ser-
vice noted: "[T]he effect of [this 
restriction], when read together with 
restrictions placed ... [on the Depart-
ment of Education through other ap-
propriations measures], might be to 
place the federal government in the 
position of continuing to fund uncon-
stitutionally segregated school sys-
tems. This is because DOJ would be 
precluded from seeking judicial en-
forcement in cases referred to it by 
[the Department of Education] under 
Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964] where student transportation 
may be the last effective desegrega-
tion remedy." (Dale, Legal Analysis 
Regarding the Enforcement Authority 
of the Department of Justice, August 
1981, p. 9; emphasis supplied.) Again, 
the legal conclusions of the Reagan 
Justice Department seem more in 
line with administration policies than 
legal realities. 
One more area where CRD has an-
tagonized civil rights proponents on 
the "race and education" issue of ele-
mentary and secondary school stu-
dents is the controversy surrounding 
the tax-exempt status of racially dis-
criminatory private schools. On J anu-
ary 8,1982, the Treasury Department 
announced that "without further 
guidance from Congress, the Internal 
Revenue Service will no longer re-
voke or deny tax-exempt status [to] ... 
organizations on the ground that they 
don't conform with fundamental 
public policies [such as racial non-
dismination]." (IRS News Release, 
Jan. 8, 1982.) Also, on that day, DOL 
in light of the Treasury announce-
ment, sought to vacate as moot two 
cases before the Supreme Court, Bob 
jones University and Goldsboro Chris-
tian Schools (Memorandum for the 
United States; Jan. 8, 1982). Both 
cases involved federal appellate 
court rulings upholding as legally cor-
rect the IRS's denial of tax-exempt 
status to schools whose admitted 
racial discrimination was based on 
religious belief. 
The IRS had established its policy 
of racial nondiscrimination in 1970 
following a D.C. District Court de-
cision, Green v. Kennedy, which tem-
porarily enjoined the Service from 
granting tax-exempt status to racially 
discriminatory schools in Mississippi. 
(309 F. Supp.1127 (D.D.C. 1970).) The 
IRS based this decision on a finding 
that it would be improper to grant tax-
exemptions to schools that violate 
important public policy objectives 
established in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. (IRS News Release; July 10, 
1970.) The Supreme Court ultimately 
affirmed the Green decision. (404 U.S. 
997 (1971).) Yet, in a subsequent deci-
sion, the Court noted: "[T]he court's 
affirmance in Green lacks the prece-
dential weight of a case involving a 
truly adversary controversy." (Bob 
jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 
725, 740 n11 (1974).) 
CRD seized upon the inconclusive-
ness of the Green affirmance in justi-
fying the administration's policy re-
versal on this matter. CRD argued 
that it was improper for the IRS to 
read a public policy requirement into 
the plain language of the con-
gressionally enacted tax-exemption 
provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Yet, after severe public cri-
ticism of the new position and con-
gressional refusal to enact a racial 
nondiscrimination requirement, CRD 
returned to the Supreme Court where 
it requested that the case be decided. 
In order to provide some semblance 
of a case or controversy within the 
Court's jurisdiction, the government 
suggested that the Court appoint 
"counsel adversary" to the school on 
the underlying issue of whether the 
IRS is statutorily required to either 
grant or deny tax-exempt status to ra-
cially discriminatory private schools. 
The Court abided by this unorthodox 
administration request and ap-
pointed William J. Coleman, Jr., to ar-
gue the "government's side" in these 
cases (50 U.S.L.W. 3837 (Apr. 19, 
1982).) On May 24, 1983, the Supreme 
Court upheld the pre-Reagan IRS po-
sition that racially discriminatory 
schools were not entitled to tax-
exempt status. (Bob jones University 
v. United States, 43 CCH S. Ct. Bull, 
2669 (1983).) 
Assistant Attorney General Rey-
nolds explained that CRD felt com-
pelled to reinstate the tax-exempt sta-
tus of racially discriminatory private 
schools since "(i]t is the province and 
duty of the Justice Department, as 
the responsible advocate of the Exe-
cutive Branch, to advance in court its 
best view of what the law says and 
means. This we have done, and will 
continue to do." (The Civil Rights Po-
licy of the Department of justice: A 
Response to the Report of the Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights, April 
1982, p. 20.) Yet, without commenting 
on the accuracy or inaccuracy of 
CRD's legal position, CRD's actions 
on this matter were in grave error for 
at least three reasons. First, there was 
no need for CRD to act. The Supreme 
Court was already set to resolve the 
statutory interpretation issue raised 
by CRD in Bob Jones University. And 
even if CRD leadership did not agree 
with the government's position in 
these cases, those attorneys who had 
been responsible for this case (and 
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prevailed before the Fourth Circuit) 
certainly would have zealously 
argued the government's position 
against vigorous opposition from Bob 
Jones University's counsel. Thus, if 
CRD had done nothing, the Court 
would have resolved the statutory 
issue in the form of a proper adver-
sarial contest. Apparently, CRD 
wanted to avoid a Court decision 
upholding the racial nondiscrimina-
tion policy. 
CRD was also in error because pri-
or dissatisfaction with congressional 
action on this issue clearly suggested 
that Congress favored the racial 
nondiscrimination requirement. The 
clear federal pol icy against 
discriminatory institutions is firmly 
established in several Supreme Court 
decisions and many congressional 
enactments. Congress' reaction to 
the D.C. District Court decision 
McG/otten v. Connally illustrates its 
opposition to granting tax exemp-
tions to racially discriminatory insti-
tutions. (338 F. Supp. 448(DDC 1972)) 
In McCiotten, the court held that 
nonprofit private clubs that excluded 
non-whites from membership were 
entitled to tax-exempt status. Con-
gress expressed its dissatisfaction 
with McGiotten by amending the tax-
exemption provision of the Internal 
Revenue Code to prohibit the gran-
ting of tax exemptions to racially 
Closing the classroom door on civil rights 
discriminatory private clubs. (26 
U.S.C. sect. 501(c)(1976).) The Senate 
Committee Report on this legislation 
states that "it is believed that it is in-
appropriate for a social club ... to be 
exempt from income taxation if its 
written policy is to discriminate on 
account of race, color, or religion."($. 
Rep. No.1318, 94thCong., 2d Sess. 8.) 
CRD can also be criticized for its 
decision to ask the Supreme Court to 
hear Bob Jones University subse-
quent to its efforts to have the case 
declared moot. Since government 
and the university agreed on the 
case's underlying issue, the Court's 
hearing of the case thus abandoned 
the fundamental requirement of 
federal judicial proceedings that the 
parties who bring a case to court 
should be the ones whose interests 
will be represented before the court. 
The Supreme Court's decision to re-
solve this case was a political one of 
the type, ironically, that the Reagan 
administration has rebuked courts 
for making. According to Attorney 
General Smith, "Responsibility for 
pol icy making in a democratic repub-
lie must reside in those who are di-
rectly accountable to the elector-
ate ... Courts are limited by Article Ill 
to deciding live disputes presented to 
them by parties with a concrete and 
particularized interest in the out-
come." (Smith, "Urging judicial Re-
straint. 68 ABA j. 59, 60 (1982).) The 
administration's handling of this mat-
ter thus suggests that its policy of 
judicial restraint is a smoke screen for 
the attainment of political ends. Re-
flective of this are CRD policies I imit-
ing certain aspects of school desegre-
gation litigation and CRD recognition 
of congressional authority over both 
court jurisdiction in fashioning deseg-
regation remedies and DOJ enforce-
ment of court-approved desegrega-
tion remedies. 
On the tax exemption issue, Ches-
ter Finn aptly noted: 
This was no case of group enti-
tlements, of government-man-
dated equality of result, or of re-
quiring preferential treatment 
for those previously disadvan-
taged by their sex or color. It was 
purely and simply a matter of 
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old-fashioned racism and of 
what the government's policy 
ought to be toward those few 
schools that openly deny admis-
sion to black youngsters on ac-
count of their color. It signalled 
that perhaps the administration 
is not really color-blind. (Finn, 
"'Affirmative Action Under Rea-
gan," Commentary, April 1982, 
p. 26.) 
Whether such bad motives can be at-
tributed to other CRD policies on the 
"race and education" issue or the 
more general question of civil rights 
enforcement is more difficult to 
gauge. Clearly, CRD positions repre-
sent a retrenchment from past admin-
istrations' support for the "civil 
rights" side of these issues. And in the 
matter of racial equality for elemen-
tary and secondary school children, 
CRD seems more concerned with ad-
vancing its anti-busing policies than 
with the law. In the "race and educa-
tion" issue, CRD policies seem con-
trary to the principle of equality 
under the law. hr 
